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Abstract—In critical infrastructures, communication networks
are used to exchange vital data among elements of Industrial
Control Systems (ICSes). Due to the criticality of such systems
and the increase of the cybersecurity risks in these contexts, best
practices recommend the adoption of Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDSes) as monitoring facilities. The choice of the positions of
IDSes is crucial to monitor as many streams of data traffic
as possible. This is especially true for the traffic patterns of
ICS networks, mostly confined in many subnetworks, which are
geographically distributed and largely autonomous. We introduce
a methodology and a software architecture that allow an ICS
operator to use the spare bandwidth that might be available in
over-provisioned networks to forward replicas of traffic streams
towards a single IDS placed at an arbitrary location. We
leverage certain characteristics of ICS networks, like stability
of topology and bandwidth needs predictability, and make use
of the Software-Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm. We fulfill
strict requirements about packet loss, for both functional and
security aspects. Finally, we evaluate our approach on network
topologies derived from real networks.
Keywords—Critical infrastructure (CI), Software Defined Net-
work (SDN), Industrial Control Systems (ICSes), Intrusion Detec-
tion System (IDS)
I. INTRODUCTION
ICSes are the core of critical infrastructures. They are
composed by many elements that interact by means of a
communication network, which we call ICS network. Main
elements of an ICS are embedded devices that control actuators
or gather data from sensors. Special servers are in charge to
collect data from these embedded devices, show them to the
control room operators, record them in a database, change set-
tings according to operators requests, etc. While the data that
flow in an ICS network are very specific, standard networking
technologies can be adopted for its implementation.
In the past decade, a growth of cyber-attacks directed
toward ICSes has been observed [1]. For the security of the
ICS networks, best practices suggest to deploy network-based
IDSes [2]. In regular networks it is acceptable to observe traffic
in a small number of relevant points. However, for reliability
reasons, in ICSes, Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
(SCADA) servers are close to sensors and actuators, hence,
traffic is mostly local. Further, attacks to ICSes are potentially
carried out by organizations (e.g., governments, intelligence
agencies, terrorist groups) that can have insiders and that
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can carefully design attacks so that they pass unobserved by
sparsely deployed IDSes. Tapping traffic close to all embedded
devices and servers can easily lead to prohibitive costs. Certain
solutions [3] make possible to route traffic replicas using the
same ICS network towards one, or a few, IDSes, but they are
not able to guarantee the successful delivery of critical ICS
traffic in all cases.
In this paper, we present a methodological approach and
an architecture to (i) allow an operator to choose which traffic
has to be observed within an ICS network without installing
new hardware, (ii) enable the use of the spare bandwidth
in the network to forward the traffic to be observed toward
an IDS, while avoiding packet loss for regular traffic, and
(iii) guarantee that the IDS receives all the traffic that the
operator configured to be observed in order not to introduce
false negatives due to packet loss. Our solution takes advantage
of the fact that topology and bandwidth usage are quite stable
in ICS networks (see for example [4]), allowing us to assume
in advance knowledge of ICS network’s traffic, since it derives
from ICS design, and to perform a global off-line optimization
of switching paths. Furthermore, we support the usage of
the ICS network for additional and occasional traffic, which
are always considered potentially dangerous. We assume that
this traffic can be served with a best-effort approach while
maximizing the endeavor in observing it. We propose an
architecture that exploits the Software-Defined Network (SDN)
approach as prescribed by the OpenFlow specifications [5]. We
evaluated our methodology against four network topologies,
derived from real topologies and augmented with realistic net-
works in the domain of electrical distribution. Our experiments
show that our optimization problem can be easily solved for
those scenarios in reasonable time and our approach makes
efficient use of the bandwidth when the topology allows it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the state of the art. In Section III, we describe
the context of ICSes and introduce basic terminologies. In
Section IV, we formally state the requirements that our solu-
tion should fulfill. In Section V, we describe our methodology
and our proposed architecture. Section VI introduces the ILP
formulation for our off-line optimization problem and in Sec-
tion VII we show the on-line algorithm for occasional traffic.
In Section VIII, we evaluate our approach against realistic
scenarios. In Section IX, we extend our approach in order to
relax some simplifying assumptions and handle special cases.
Conclusions are drawn in Section X.
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II. STATE OF THE ART AND BACKGROUND
ICS networks make use of proprietary protocols, as shown
in [2]. Those protocols (e.g. ModBus [6]) are tipically
application-layer, and they allow the communication among
ICS devices. In many cases, proprietary protocols are used also
to compute routing [7], but this does not limit the adoption of
different link-layer technologies [8] and new installations tend
to be based on widely adopted standards, like Ethernet. Proto-
cols adopted in ICS networks do not consider security aspects,
hence, well known recommendations (e.g. [2]) suggest, among
several other countermeasures, the adoption of IDSes. Forcing
network traffic to cross the IDS is not so simple, especially if
a network administrator needs to be flexible in the selection of
traffic that has to be observed. Some flexibility can be gained
by adopting proprietary protocols (like ERSPAN [3]), which
however offers an unhandy solution and does not guarantee
that the rest of the traffic is not affected.
In the last years, a new centralized approach called
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is collecting the attention
of the research community due to its promising benefits and,
in particular, its flexibility in the selection of the paths to
route packets [9]. There have been many attempts in exploiting
SDN in security contexts. Some works [10], [11] propose
to implement the IDS as an SDN controller module. We
argue that such approach poses strong scalability issues and
it is not advisable in the critical infrastructure context. A
different approach consists in exploiting SDN to forward traffic
towards one or more IDSes, as shown in [12], [13] for the
cloud computing applicative context. These solutions cannot be
directly adopted in the ICS context since they do not provide
any guarantee about the delivery of regular traffic.
A relevant aspect in our approach is traffic engineering.
In [14], authors show that having a traffic-matrix allows
traffic engineering problems to be easily solved. Usually, the
traffic engineering problem is treated as a multicommodity flow
problem whose solution is described in [15]. Proposals that are
specific to traffic engineering for SDN can be found in [16],
[17], [18]. At the best of our knowledge, our approach is the
first attempt to apply traffic engineering to the specific context
of traffic monitoring by IDS leveraging the coordinates of the
topologies and traffic in ICS networks.
III. APPLICATION CONTEXT AND TERMINOLOGIES
For the sake of simplicity, we assume the ICS network
to be isolated from the corporate network. While this is not
completely true in general, still isolation (physical or by means
of a firewall) is the best practice [2]. Hence, in the rest of
the paper, we only address traffic monitoring and management
solely in the context of ICS networks. ICS networks connect
several kinds of devices. For the purpose of our discussion
we divide them in two categories. We call the first category
essential: devices in this category can have a very diverse
nature, but they are essential for the correct operation of the
ICS, are part of the ICS design, and are always connected to
the ICS network. To let the reader better understand the ap-
plicative context, we provide a more concrete description. We
distinguish them in embedded devices and servers. Embedded
devices1 control actuators gather data from sensors, and realize
closed-loop control for restricted parts of the industrial system.
They can send gathered data to servers and can be remotely
controlled or configured, for example by asking to open/close
a circuit switcher or by setting values, called set-points, that
are objective of the closed-loop control, like, for instance, a
target temperature of a heater. Typically, servers are (i) the
SCADA, which gather data from embedded devices and process
them, for example, to detect industrial process faults, (ii) the
Human-Machine Interfaces (HMI) that show to control room
operators the current status of the ICS and allow the operator
to specify commands or new set-points for embedded devices,
and (iii) the historian DB, which stores gathered data for future
off-line analysis. We call the second category non-essential:
occasionally, other devices can be attached to the ICS network,
for example operators’ notebooks to perform maintenance of
ICS devices or to perform firmware updates.
We call stream a communication between two devices
on the ICS network. We identify it by its source and its
destination, specified by IP addresses. Even though commu-
nications are usually bidirectional, throughout this paper we
consider a stream to be unidirectional, which means that a full
communication between two devices generally encompasses
two streams. A stream can be critical or standard. In a critical
stream, source and destination are essential devices and the
properties about the stream are known in the ICS design phase.
In particular their bandwidth demand, source, and destination
are known. A reliable delivery of critical streams is considered
fundamental for the proper working of the ICS and substantial
resources are available to guarantee this, in term of design
effort, equipment, etc. A standard stream is not essential for
the current functioning of the ICS and it is not known in
advance. It usually involves at least one non-essential device,
but it can be involved in an occasional communication between
two essential devices. Supporting standard streams is important
to enable occasional use of the ICS network for maintenance
or other non-critical activities, hence a best-effort delivery is
enough for this kind of streams.
From the point of view of the security concerns, both kinds
of streams are equally important, since attacks may involve
any of the two with equal chance of disruptive effects. An
attack to the ICS network consists in any action that introduces
unexpected traffic or unexpected changes to standard traffic. To
be more clear, it consists in a source of malicious traffic (e.g. a
malware or a rogue device) or in the action of tampering with
any critical or standard stream. We assume that switches cannot
be tampered with. We point out that security of switching
devices is out of the scope of this paper. We suppose there
exists a centralized Intrusion Detection System (IDS) in the
ICS network, which is able to recognize malicious traffic and
properly send alarms.
The goal of this paper is to provide a flexible way to use
a centralized IDS. To achieve this, we assume that a standard
stream σ is duplicated, generating a replica stream; this action
is performed at a network node that we call observation point.
Each replica stream σ¯, associated with σ, originates at the
1For the reader that is acquainted with the ICS context, we are referring
to Programmable Logic Controllers, Remote Terminal Units, Intelligent Elec-
tronic Devices, etc.
observation point and ends at the IDS. The extension to several
IDSes requires minimal effort and it is discussed in Section IX.
IV. REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we list the requirements that our method-
ology should fulfill. We also point out the limitations of the
current practice.
1) Observation Points – Our methodology should be able
to support the observation of potentially any stream
in the network, independently from topology and IDS
placement. For security reasons, we prefer observation
points close to the destination of streams.
Concerning current practice, in certain switches, it is
possible to remotely mirror a port and also tunneling
the traffic of the replica (see for example the ERSPAN
technology). However, this approach provides no control
on the bandwidth occupation on each link and it is limited
to specific vendors support.
2) Reliable Replica Forwarding – Our methodology should
guarantee no packet loss for replica streams associated
with critical or standard streams. This is important in
order for the IDS to inspect all observed traffic and avoid
false negatives due to packet loss.
Concerning current practice, the adoption of remote mir-
roring technologies implies that the replica is delivered
with a best-effort approach. To overcome this, in prin-
ciple, traffic engineering and QoS techniques might be
applied. However, this considerably increases the archi-
tectural complexity. Further, a centralized management,
like the one described in Section V, is needed anyway.
3) Reliable Critical Streams Forwarding – Our methodol-
ogy should be able to configure the ICS network so that,
for the critical streams, no packets loss can occur due to
congestion.
This requirement is motivated by the fact that, due to
Requirement 1, replica streams may easily overload some
links and make the usual over-provisioning strategies
ineffective. Actually, up to a certain extent, forwarding
reliability can be realized by adopting reliable transport
protocols like TCP. However, support of TCP is non-
obvious for certain embedded devices. Further, retrans-
mission could introduce a delay that is not acceptable in
the ICS context and no bandwidth guarantee is provided.
The adoption of QoS and traffic engineering exhibits the
same drawbacks as discussed for Requirement 2.
4) Standard Streams Usability – Our methodology should
allow operators to use the ICS network for occasional
tasks, which results in injecting new standard streams.
While the presence of these streams should not adversely
impact the fulfillment of other requirements, we expect
standard streams to be treated by the ICS network in fair
way. Therefore, usage of the ICS network for occasional
tasks produce the same outcome for all occasional users
and applications.
We also consider the well-founded technology constraint
that imposes not to split streams. In fact, if packets of the
same stream take different paths, uncontrolled reordering can
happen, which is detrimental for TCP performance at best and
can change the semantic of datagram-based communications
at worst.
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Fig. 1: Architecture of our system, with both offline and online
routing solvers.
V. A METHODOLOGY AND AN ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we describe a methodology and architecture
that solve the problem described in Section III with the aim
of satisfying the requirements described in Section IV.
Our methodology assumes that the network is made of
SDN switches that are compliant with the OpenFlow stan-
dard [5]. We exploit the OpenFlow features to: (i) configure
network switches to forward critical streams on the basis of
globally optimized paths, (ii) configure network switches to
forward standard streams on the basis of paths chosen by an
on-line greedy approach, (iii) instruct certain network switches
(observation points) to duplicate traffic, for the streams that
have to be observed (either critical or standard), and perform
the first forwarding step of replica streams towards the IDS,
(iv) configure network switches to forward replica for critical
streams towards the IDS choosing paths that are globally
optimized by our off-line approach, (v) configure network
switches to forward replicas for standard streams along paths
that are dynamically selected with our on-line greedy algo-
rithm, and (vi) configure shaping of all streams at ingress
network switches.
To meet Requirements 2 and 3, we configure the SDN
network to shape each stream at its ingress node, so that
packets enter the network at a specified constant rate and
all packets exceeding the configured bandwidth are discarded.
For critical streams, the configured maximum bandwidth is
determined during the design as described below, so no packet
drop should happen. For standard streams, this early limiting
avoids congestion of internal nodes that could adversely impact
critical streams. The shaping configuration exploits the meter
feature of the OpenFlow specifications.
Our methodology encompasses a design phase and an
operation phase (see Fig. 1). In the design phase, we require an
ICS designer to determine the network topology and to list the
critical streams along with their maximal required bandwidth.
These data are provided as input to an off-line routing solver,
which computes the configuration of the SDN switches for
critical streams. More specifically, the input of the off-line
routing solver encompasses (i) the network topology, (ii) the
location of essential devices, (iii) the location of the IDS, and
(iv) for each critical stream its source, its destination and its
bandwidth requirement. The off-line solver produces, for each
critical stream, (i) a forwarding path, (ii) an observation point,
and (iii) a forwarding path for the corresponding replica stream
starting at the observation point and ending at the IDS. The off-
line solver is based on an ILP formulation, which is described
in detail in Section VI.
In the operation phase, we mandate the adoption of a
special architecture (shown in Fig. 1) in which an SDN-
controller is in charge of configuring forwarding paths and
meters to implement shaping. Its configuration is divided into
two parts: one for critical streams and one for standard streams.
The part related to critical streams is configured on the basis
of the result of the off-line solver and does not change during
operation. The part related to standard streams dynamically
changes during operation to adapt the configuration of the
ICS network when the set of active standard streams changes.
A control room operator can monitor the status of the ICS
network during production time to have a clear picture of
what streams are currently replicated and processed by the
IDS. During operation, any new packet reaching a network
switch that does not match any of the rules configured in the
switch to forward critical streams is treated as the first packet
of a standard stream σ. This packet is forwarded to the SDN-
controller as in the classical SDN approach. To compute the
forwarding path for σ, the SDN-controller takes advantage of
an on-line routing solver. This solver shares with the controller
the network topology, and the current available bandwidth on
each link derived from currently allocated paths. It takes as
input the source s and destination t of σ and computes (i) a
forwarding path P for σ, (ii) an observation point op ∈ P
(preferably close to t according to Requirement 1), (iii) a
forwarding path Q from op to the IDS, and (iv) a new
assignment of bandwidth for all standard streams comprising
σ. The details of the on-line routing solver are described in
Section VII. These information are used by the controller to re-
configure the shaping for all standard streams but σ. The new
standard stream σ is configured only after a small amount of
time τ that is dimensioned so that packets related to previous
standard streams that where admitted in the network with the
old bandwidth allocation are guaranteed to reach destination.
Concerning the path selection, our algorithm has a greedy
approach keeping unchanged all paths previously allocated
for both kinds of streams. There are several reasons for this
choice: (i) sophisticated optimization techniques, like those
used in in Section VI, may take a considerable amount of
time, which can easily be even larger than the lifespan of
the new stream and impair the usability of the network for
occasional activities, (ii) modifying the path of a current stream
can introduce temporary inconsistencies in the routing that can
lead to packet loss, which is against Requirements 3 and 2,
(iii) since standard streams have usually a short lifespan, our
main goal is to support them within the requirements listed in
Section IV, keeping the optimization of their resource usage
as a secondary goal.
VI. PROBLEM FORMULATION FOR THE OFF-LINE
ROUTING SOLVER
In this section, we present the ILP formulation that is at
the basis of the off-line routing solver introduced in Sec-
tion V. For the sake of simplicity, we made a number of
assumptions. Section IX relaxes many of them and describes
several extensions. Our formulation finds, for each critical
stream σ, a forwarding path Pσ , an observation point opσ ,
and the forwarding path of the replica stream σ¯ from opσ to
the IDS d. Our formulation is a variation of the well-known
multicommodity flow problem [15]. In the following, the role
of commodities are played by streams and we call flow the
part of our solution that pertains to a certain critical stream.
In this section, all the streams are critical unless different
specification is provided. Our variation takes into account the
following aspects: (i) streams are unsplittable, i.e., it is not
allowed for a flow to bifurcate (see Section IV), (ii) flow
demands (i.e., stream bandwidth) are fixed and all critical
streams must be routed, (iii) each stream can generate a new
replica stream originating at its observation point which must
be the last traversed node before the destination, (iv) nodes of
the network that represent embedded devices and servers do
not have switching capabilities.
Since replica streams can take up a lot of bandwidth, we
make the observation of a stream optional by introducing a
relevance parameter ρσ for each stream σ, which indicates
how important it is for σ to be the observed.
In our formulation, we use the following notation. The
network is represented by a directed graph G = (V,E), where
V is a set of vertices and E is a set of directed edges. Each
physical link corresponds to two oppositely directed edges
(v, w). Each edge e ∈ E has a capacity C(e) that corresponds
to the available bandwidth of the link in the corresponding
direction. The set of vertices V is partitioned in two subsets:
N , representing network switches, and M , representing de-
vices with no switching capabilities (e.g., embedded devices
and servers). We assume that there is no connection among
vertices in M . The IDS is denoted by d ∈ M . For the sake
of simplicity, we do not include the SDN-controller in this
model, assuming that connectivity between SDN-controller
and network switches is obtained either by a dedicated out-
of-band network or by protecting part of the bandwidth of
the SDN network using proper configurations. A stream is a
quadruple σ = (sσ, tσ, Bσ, ρσ) containing its source, its desti-
nation, its bandwidth demand, and its relevance, respectively.
A corresponding replica stream is a triple σ¯ = (opσ, d, Bσ¯),
where opσ is its source (such that (opσ, tσ) ∈ E), d is its
destination, and Bσ¯ = Bσ is its bandwidth demand. The
set of the critical streams is denoted Crit , the set of the
corresponding replica streams is denoted Rep.
For each e ∈ E we define xeσ ∈ {0, 1} as a variable that
has the following meaning
xeσ =
{
1, if stream σ is being routed through link e
0, otherwise
Analogously, variables xeσ¯ are defined for the corresponding
replica stream σ¯ associated with σ. If a stream σ is not
observed, it will be xeσ¯ = 0 ∀e ∈ E.
We now define a few convenience functions. We provide
definitions for a critical stream σ ∈ Crit and a vertex v ∈ V ,
the corresponding definitions for replica streams σ¯ ∈ Rep are
analogous.
Outgoing flow Outσ(v) =
∑
(v,w)∈E
x(v,w)σ (1)
Incoming flow Inσ(v) =
∑
(u,v)∈E
x(u,v)σ (2)
Vertex flow imbalance Fσ(v) = Outσ(v)− Inσ(v) (3)
The bandwidth consumed by the critical and replica streams
must comply with link capacities:
Capacity constraints.
∀e ∈ E : C(e)−
∑
σ∈Crit
(xeσ + x
e
σ¯) ·Bσ ≥ 0 (4)
For each critical or replica streams, we need to express flow
conservation. Since flows are unsplittable, each stream gener-
ates (consumes) one unit of flow at its source (destination).
Conservation is expressed separately for each stream:
Flow conservation and demand constraints for critical
streams.
∀σ ∈ Crit
∀v ∈ V − {sσ, tσ} : Fσ(v) = 0
Outσ(sσ) = 1,
Inσ(tσ) = 1
(5)
We now need to express similar constraints for replica streams.
Let Lσ be the set of the possible observation points for σ, i.e.,
Lσ = {v ∈ N |(v, tσ) ∈ E}. Flows should be balanced for all
vertices in N −Lσ , and each vertex in Lσ can produce a unit
of replica flow only if it is the last hop of the path assigned
to σ (by unsplittable flow this is unique), and the IDS cannot
be source of flow.
Flow conservation and demand constraints for replica streams.
∀σ ∈ Crit
∀v ∈ N − Lσ : Fσ¯(v) = 0
∀v ∈ Lσ : Fσ¯(v) ≤ x(v,t)σ
∀e ∈ E exiting d : xeσ¯ = 0
(6)
The above constraints also imply that Inσ¯(d) ≤ 1, since for
each σ only one variable x(v,t)σ can be equal to one by the
unsplittable flow property.
As stated above, only vertices in N have switching capa-
bilities. Hence, all nodes in M should have, for their adjacent
edges, flow equal to zero but for the streams for which they
are source or destination:
∀σ ∈ Crit ,∀v ∈M − {sσ, tσ}, e adjacent to v
xeσ = 0∀σ¯ ∈ Rep,∀v ∈M − {d}, e adjacent to v
xeσ¯ = 0
(7)
Our objective function consists of two parts: the first one
expresses the residual capacity on all the links, while the
second states the preference for observing the streams.
max
∑
σ∈Crit
∑
e∈E
C(e)−Bσ · (xeσ + xeσ¯)
C(e)
+
∑
σ∈Crit
KρσInσ¯(d)
(8)
Input:
- topology G(V,E) where V = N ∪M (see Section VI),
- a new standard stream σ = (s, t) with s, t ∈M ,
- the IDS d ∈ N ,
- sets S and C of standard and critical streams with paths and
bandwith assignment.
Output:
- a path P from t to s,
- an observation point op ∈ P ,
- a path Q from op to d,
- a new bandwidth assignment for streams in S ∪ σ.
1: for all e ∈ E do . compute capacities for WIDESTPATH()
2: Let m be the number of standard streams that shares link e
3: Let β be the capacity of e available for standard streams
4: Assign to each edge e ∈ E a capacity C(e) = β/(m+ 1)
5: end for
6: Let L(i) be the list of vertices in N at distance i from t, with i = 1 . . . k,
where k = dist(s, t)− 2.
7: bbest ← 0, Pbest ← none, Qbest ← none
8: for i in 1 . . . k do
9: for all v in L(i) do . v is a candidate observation point
10: SO← WIDESTPATH(G, s, v)
11: OD← WIDESTPATH(G, v, d)
12: OT← WIDESTPATH(G, v, t)
13: b← min(bw(OT ), bw(SO), bw(OD))
14: if b > bbest then
15: bbest ← b
16: op← v
17: Pbest ← SO|OT
18: Qbest ← OD,
19: end if
20: end for
21: . op is the best observation point at distance i from t
22: if bbest > 0 then
23: Recompute bandwidth assignment for streams S ∪ σ using Water
Filling technique [19].
24: return Pbest, op, Qbest, new bandwidth assignment for S ∪ σ
25: end if
26: end for
Fig. 2: Algorithm for handling a new standard stream.
Overall, we would like to maximize both parts. In the above
formulation we give precedence to the second part. That is,
we prefer to observe streams with respect to leaving more
residual bandwidth. In order to enforce this, we multiply the
second part by K, which we suppose to be big. We also state
that ρσ must be integer and greater than or equal to one, and
that K must be chosen to be larger than the range of values
that the first part can take, namely K > |E| · |Crit |.
VII. STANDARD STREAMS: METHODOLOGY AND
ALGORITHM
In this section, we describe our on-line algorithm for
routing standard streams and their related replica streams. The
algorithm takes as input a new standard stream σ = (s, t),
where s is its source and t is its destination, and, on the basis of
the topology of the network, of the available bandwidth on the
links, and of the previously allocated paths and bandwidth, it
produces as result(i) a path P to be used to forward the packets
belonging to σ, (ii) a switch op ∈ P (observation point) where
the traffic of σ is duplicated, (iii) a path Q to be used to
forward the replica stream of the traffic of σ from op to the
IDS, (iv) an assignment of bandwidth for all currently active
standard streams, comprising σ, that should be configured in
the ICS network as explained in Section V, so that all streams
are forwarded respecting Requirements 2 and 4.
Once the path for the new standard stream is computed,
our algorithm re-assigns the bandwidth to all standard streams
in order to fulfill Requirement 4. Bandwidth reduction entails
a reconfiguration of limiting and shaping and we assume this
operation can be safely performed without any packet loss.
However, in order to avoid packet loss during the transition, we
should ensure that no queue grows because of the simultaneous
presence of packets bursts sent with previous configuration
of bandwidth and packets of the new stream σ, which may
account for an overall bandwidth greater than one of the links.
To address this issue, the new stream is admitted in the
network only after a small amount of time τ that ensures that
all packets injected with the previous bandwidth configuration
are delivered. The parameter τ should be greater than the
maximum delivery latency of any packet, which, however, is
a quite small number and is irrelevant for the vast majority
of usage scenarios. The algorithm is formally described in
Figure 2. As motivated in Section IV, the algorithm select
observation points as close as possible to t and secondarily try
to allocate the largest possible bandwidth. The latter choice
takes advantage of the standard WIDESTPATH() function [20],
which performs a depth first search with backtracking looking
for the path with the widest bottleneck. Bandwidths to be
used in WIDESTPATH() are computed in the first step of the
algorithm. To account for bandwidth reassignment for previ-
ously allocated standard streams, we estimated the bandwidth
available for σ as the the total bandwidth available for standard
streams divided by the number of streams after the allocation
of σ.
Then, the algorithm starts enumerating the candidate ob-
servation points op ordered by increasing distance from t.
Within the same value of distance, the op that allows the
widest bandwidth b is chosen. Once b has been computed,
it is compared with bbest, replacing it if and only if b is
greater than bbest (lines 14 – 19). At this point, our algorithm
recomputes all bandwidth assignment using the Water Filling
(WF) technique [19] (lines 22 – 24), allowing us to find the
maximum amount of bandwidth to assign to each stream. We
realize WF in the following way. Suppose, the SDN-controller
keeps a data structure that associates with each edge e the set
of streams S(e) passing through e. Let c(e) be the available
bandwidth for standard streams. WF looks for an edge e¯ such
that e¯ has the minimum of c(e)/|S(e)|. WF consider e¯ a
bottleneck, hence, all streams in S(e¯) are assigned bandwidth
c(e¯)/|S(e¯)| and discarded. Remaining bandwidth c(e) are re-
computed for all edges and the search is performed again until
all streams are discarded and their bandwidth assigned. In this
way, our algorithm successfully computes: i) Pbest, namely
the best available path; ii) op, namely the starting vertex for
replica streams; iii) Qbest, namely the best path for replica
stream; iv) new bandwidth assignment for S and σ.
The complexity of the WIDESTPATH() functions is O(|E|),
as it is based on BFS algorithm, and it is run on each vertex
a constant number of times. Hence, the observation point is
found in O(|V ||E|) time. The WF takes O(|E||S|). Therefore,
the overall worst case time complexity of our on-line algorithm
is O(|E|(|V |+ |S|)). Actually, in the most common cases, we
Fig. 3: Details of the electricity distribution’s substation.
think the op is found in time much smaller than O(|V |), so
the time complexity can be often regarded to be O(|E||S|).
VIII. EVALUATION
We validated our approach from three points of view: (i) we
assess the efficiency of our implementation with respect to
computation time on realistic instances, inspired by the elec-
tricity distribution domain, for both on-line and off-line routing
solvers, (ii) we show the efficiency of the bandwidth allocation
of the on-line routing solver for standard streams, and (iii) we
discuss the ability of our solution to meet requirements listed
in Section IV.
We identified four different realistic topologies in the fol-
lowing way. We selected four large topologies form topology-
zoo.org that are equipped with real link bandwidths or that are
fairly mashed. When no links bandwidth are available 1Gbps
links was assumed. We considered each node n to be a router
associated with a city. We equipped each city with a number
of electrical substations whose ICS network is connected to n.
Let Bn be the sum of the bandwidth of all links incident to
node n. The node with the largest value of Bn is also equipped
with one IDS serving the whole network. The city associated
with node n, is equipped with qn identical substations. The
total number of substations in the network is q =
∑
n qn.
The dimensioning of qn is provided below. The network of
a substation is designed on the basis of information that can
be freely found in the Internet2. Figure 3 shows the topology
of a single substation with its connection to the router and
Table I shows the devices it contains. Industrial process data
are communicated from embedded devices to the local scada
system, and in turn to the HMI and to the DB. The amount
of bandwidth required by these communications is shown in
Table I, which also show the quantity of each sensors/actuators.
For the relevance, we chose always the value 1. We equip each
city with a number qn of substations according to a decreasing
power law distribution. In practice, nodes n are sorted by their
value of Bn. For n with the largest Bn, we state qn = 10. For
n in position i, qn = b10/iαc, where α is chosen between 0.7
and 1. When setting the capacities of the edges we reserved
5% of the bandwidth for standard streams. Data about used
topologies are shown in Table II.
2Each of them modeled following the Wikipedia description https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Electrical substation
From SCADA To SCADA
Qty Bandwidth Bandwidth
Voltage
Meter 2 10 Kbps 100 Kbps
Circuit
Switches 2 1.5 Kbps 1.5 Kbps
Breakers 2 1.5 Kbps 1.5 Kbps
Current
Meters 2 10 Kbps 100 Kbps
Power
Transformer 1 50 Kbps 500 Kbps
HMI 1 30000 Kbps 3000 Kbps
Historian
DB 1 30000 Kbps 3000 Kbps
TABLE I: Elements of a substation with the bandwidth of the
streams used for the evaluation.
From Topology Zoo Input for experiments
Name |N | |E| min bw
(bps)
max bw
(bps)
q |N |+
|M |
|E| num.
strms
1 Cesnet 10 9 200M 600M 35 501 920 770
2 AttMpls 25 56 1G 1G 50 726 1357 1100
3 Agis 25 30 45M 155M 42 614 1123 924
4 Uninet 74 101 1G 1G 95 1405 2572 2090
TABLE II: Data about original topologies, and topologies used
in the experimentation.
To validate our off-line routing solver, we instantiated
the ILP problem for our four topologies and solved them
using Gurobi optimizer ver. 6.5. The formulation set up was
performed by using the Python API. The corresponding code
is available on the Internet [21]. The computation run on a
workstation equipped with 8 processors Intel Xeon 2.8GHz.
Results for the off-line solver are shown in Table III. The
evaluation shows that the formulation of Section VI can be
practically used. Considering that the foreseen usage of the
formulation is during design, running times are quite small.
This makes us believing that our approach could be success-
fully used even in much larger scenarios. Even though, solving
times are small, they are not suitable for an on-line use. This
justify the introduction of the specific ad-hoc on-line solver,
whose algorithm was presented in Section VII.
To validate the on-line routing solver, for each network, we
randomly generated a sequence of events (available at [21])
as follows. We suppose that standard streams are initiated
by (human) operators, whose number is proportional to the
network size. We choose to have as many operators as sub-
stations (i.e., q). Each operator u is attached to a switch
s ∈ N chosen uniformly at random and generates a sequence
containing two kinds of events: (i) begin(c, u, t) operator u
Results (off-line)
gurobi
execution
time
number of
observed
streams
max %bw
on edge
1 12s 764 97.795%
2 30s 1100 62.060%
3 33s 869 98.058%
4 421s 2087 99.455%
TABLE III: Results of the experimentation for the off-line
routing solver.
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Fig. 4: Density of bandwith assigned to streams for each
topology (log scale on the x-axis).
starts a connection, identified by c, with machine t ∈ M ,
and (ii) end(c) connection c ends. Interarrival time between
begin of connections is exponentially distributed with mean
1/λ. Duration of each connection is exponentially distributed
with mean 3/λ (i.e., each operator on average connects to 3
machines at the same time). We set 1/λ = 5 minutes and the
sequence spans about 10 minutes (from 176 to 576 streams).
We initialized the status of the solver with the output of
the off-line solver for critical streams. Then, we run, for each
network, the on-line solver on its sequence of events generated
as described above. Figure 4 shows a density diagram, that
has on the x-axis possible bandwidth values and on the y-
axis the fraction of streams that had that bandwidth assigned
in our experiments. In our experiment, assigned bandwidth is
always very close to the maximum of the backbone bandwidth.
Sometime, if source and destination of the stream are close
each other, assigned bandwith can be larger (cf. Table II).
The off-line optimization, together with the traffic shap-
ing approach described in Section V, ensures compliance to
Requirements 1, 2, and 3. Further, the inclusion of standard
streams is performed only by using the spare bandwidth of
each link, thus protecting critical stream and replica streams
from packet loss due to congestion (see Section VII). Re-
quirement 4 encompasses two essential aspects: fairness of
bandwidth allocation and response time. Our approach handle
all streams always assigning the same bandwidth to all of
them and dynamically adapting it on the basis of the current
needs. This ensures fairness at expense of some bandwidth
waste, since certain streams may not use the whole bandwidth
assigned to them. To improve this aspect, dynamic polling of
bandwidth usage should be adopted [16], however, we believe
that in the ICS context, this approach may not be worth the
effort. Concerning response time, this mostly depends on the
internal architecture of the SDN-controller. A further aspect is
the time τ the controller have to wait to be sure no packet
loss occurs when the bandwidth of certain streams have to be
reduced (see Section V). Since τ should be greater than the
time a packet traverse the network, we expect it to be no more
than a few milliseconds, which should be negligible for all
applications that are reasonable to use in the ICS context.
IX. POSSIBLE VARIATIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS
In this section we discuss possible variations to the ap-
proach described in Sections V, VI, and VII.
Bandwidth Reservation for Standard Streams. Our ap-
proach statically allocate bandwidth for critical streams and
their replica streams, using the spare bandwidth for standard
streams. However, it is easy to use our formulation to explic-
itly save some bandwidth for this purpose during design by
artificially reducing the capacities C(e) of Constraint 4.
Dynamicity. In the description of our approach, we suppose
that the needs for monitoring the critical streams are known
in advance and embodied in the relevance parameters ρσ .
However, there are situations in which we may want to
dynamically choose which stream IDS has to analyze. For
example, when an anomaly is recognized, we may want the
IDS analysis to focus on the devices close to it, possibly
momentarily giving up the inspection of traffic of other devices
to free up network and IDS resources. This can be supported
by implementing in the controller with capability to switch off
observation of critical streams upon request of the control room
operator. Further, operator may explicitly ask for observation
of a critical stream σ that was currently not observed. To
implement this operation, a search for the widest path starting
from the last hop before tσ to the IDS have to be performed. If
the resulting available bandwidth on the widest path is greater
than Bσ , the SDN-controller set up the rules for duplication
and forwarding toward the IDS, otherwise the search can be
done backward along the path from the tσ to sσ . Alternatively,
since this somewhat relaxes the support for Requirement 1, the
bottlenecks identified by the widest path algorithm can be used
to suggest a set of streams whose observation can be switched
off to free up enough network resources to satisfy the operator
request.
Limited IDS Resources. In our description, we supposed that
the IDS has unlimited computational power. While this might
be reasonable if the IDS is based on cloud technologies, often
the designer should deal with IDS limits. If we suppose that
the IDS is known to scale up to a certain bandwidth Bd, the
formulation of Section VI can support it by simply introducing
the following constraint.∑
σ¯∈Rep
Inσ¯(d) ≤ Bd (9)
However, special care should be taken in handling standard
streams. In fact, during the off-line optimization, some IDS
bandwidth should be saved for the analysis of standard streams
replicas. Further, on-line routing solver must consider the IDS
bandwidth when calculating the new bandwidth assignment for
all the standard streams in the WF phase. Essentially, both on-
line and off-line solver can address the problem as if the IDS
were reachable only through a link of capacity Bd.
Support for Multiple IDSes. For the sake of simplicity, in
our description, we assumed that only one IDS is present in
the ICS network. However, there are situations in which it
might be convenient to have more IDSes d1, . . . , dk ∈ D
distributed across the ICS network. Hence, a stream can be
observed by any of the IDSes. The formulation of Section VI
can be changed to support this in the following way. Variables
xeσ¯ are substituted with distinct variable sets x
e
σ,d for each IDS
d ∈ D. The functions Outσ,d(v), Inσ,d(v), and Fσ,d(v) are
defined for each d ∈ D as obvious variations of Equations 1, 2,
and 3. In Constraint 4, xeσ¯ should be substituted by
∑
d∈D x
e
σ,d.
Constraints 6 should be substituted by
∀σ ∈ Crit
∀v ∈ N − Lσ : Fσ,d(v) = 0
∀v ∈ Lσ :
∑
d∈D Fσ,d(v) ≤ x(v,t)σ∀d ∈ D, ∀e ∈ E exiting d : xeσ,d = 0
(10)
Since only one variable among x(v,t)σ can be greater than zero
(by unsplittability of flows), the second inequality implies that
only one IDS is involved in the observation of σ. The second
of Constrants 7 should be substituted by
∀σ ∈ Crit ,∀d ∈ D,∀v ∈M − {d}, e adjacent to v
xeσ,d = 0
(11)
Finally, the objective function should be changed into
max
∑
σ∈Crit
(
Kρσ
∑
d∈D
Inσ¯(d)+
∑
e∈E
C(e)−Bσ · (xeσ +
∑
d∈D x
e
σ,d)
C(e)
)
‘ (12)
With these changes, the formulation automatically perform
IDS assignment to streams so that objective function is maxi-
mized.
Flow Table Size Control. In SDN networks, the number of
rules configured in each network switch is a concern. In fact,
rules occupy entries in limited size flow tables. Since, the
SDN-controller configures a rule for each outgoing stream,
limits to the flow table can be take into account by the
following constraints, where FT (v) is the maximum number
of rules that can be configured in the switch v.
∀v ∈ N
∑
σ∈Crit
(
Outσ(v) +
∑
∀d∈D
Outσ,d(v)
)
≤ FT (v) (13)
X. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a methodology and an architecture that enable
flexible adoption of one IDS (or a few of them), while
keeping the possibility to mirror any stream in the network and
forward it toward the IDS independently from its deployment
location. While we think that our approach can be useful
in many contexts, we tailored it for the usage within ICS
networks, where most of the traffic flows are critical and
known in advance, and occasional usage can be handled with
a best effort approach. We base our work on SDN technology,
which allowed us to keep a simple centrally managed network
configuration. We presented several small-effort extensions to
the basic description in Section IX. However, the integration
of a distributed approach for the SDN-controller, like the one
presented in [22], in our architecture, may be the subject
of additional research. Further, in our solution, we statically
assigned bandwidth to all critical streams, disregarding cases
in which traffic is not stable over time. Better usage of the
bandwidth could be achieved by taking this into account.
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